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“Segs and the City” and Cutting-Edge Aesthetic
Experiences: Resolving the Circuit Split on Tour
Guides’ Licensing Requirements and the First
Amendment
Marie J. Plecha†

I.

INTRODUCTION

Tourism represents an important contributor to state and local
economies.1 The industry is growing within the United States, as domestic and international travel to and within states continues to increase and contribute to revenue.2 Accordingly, some U.S. cities have
sought to regulate operations of the industry, including the activities of
official tour guides.3 City tour guides can play an essential role in influencing visitors’ perceptions of a city’s history, cultural customs, and anthropological development. This is especially the case given the rapid
expansion of information technology, as tourists increasingly rely on
human guides only where they seek a customized interactive experience
on their visits to a particular locality.4
A circuit split currently exists between the Fifth Circuit and the
D.C. Circuit regarding whether cities may impose rigorous licensing requirements on potential tour guides, which can include written examinations, personal background checks, and even drug tests.5 The
†

B.A. Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate, The University of Chicago Law School.
See, e.g., Importance & Economic Impact of Domestic Tourism, WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM
COUNCIL, https://www.wttc.org/publications/2018/domestic-tourism/ [https://perma.cc/EJW2LKC3].
2
See, e.g., U.S. Travel and Tourism Overview, U.S. TRAVEL ASS’N, https://www.ustravel.org
/system/files/media_root/document/Research_Fact-Sheet_US-Travel-and-Tourism-Overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TH9D-WJU9] (updated Mar. 2020) (noting that U.S. domestic travel increased
1.9 percent from 2017 to a total of 2.3 billion person-trips in 2018).
3
Id.
4
For a longer discussion, see Betty Weiler & Rosemary Black, The Changing Face of the Tour
Guide: One-way Communicator to Choreographer to Co-creator of the Tourist Experience, 40
TOURISM RECREATION RES. 364–78 (2015), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02508281
.2015.1083742 [https://perma.cc/W7VX-JHUD].
5
Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that a licensing scheme
for tour guides was content neutral and that requiring guides to pass an examination and drug
test furthered the city’s substantial interests in protecting the tourism industry and protecting the
public from crime). Contra Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding
that the District’s licensing scheme of for-hire tour guides was not narrowly tailored to further the
District’s substantial interest in promoting the industry and economy, as necessary to constitute
an acceptable limitation on protected speech under the First Amendment).
1
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essential debate concerns whether the licensing requirements constitute an unacceptable limitation on protected speech in violation of the
First Amendment, or if the tests represent a permissible exercise of the
city’s police powers in an effort to regulate the local tourism industry.6
Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Kagan v. City of New Orleans,7 the split endures among the federal courts of appeal.
A key development in Supreme Court jurisprudence since the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Kagan and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Edwards
v. District of Columbia8 is the Supreme Court’s decision providing guidance regarding the appropriate treatment of professional speech with
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA)9 in
2018. In that case, the Court struck down a statute implementing mandatory notice requirements for crisis pregnancy centers, and held that
“professional speech” of individuals who perform services requiring a
state license is not a separate category of speech exempt from the rule
that content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.10 Hence, if
tour guides’ speech is a form of “professional speech” as referenced in
NIFLA, the decision could implicate the extent to which state and local
governments may constitutionally regulate it.
This Comment will argue that tour guides’ speech is not a form of
professional speech. Thus, as will be explored, the circuit split should
be resolved by applying the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Edwards to
strike down similar tour guide licensing schemes as unconstitutional
violations of the First Amendment. These licensing statutes should be
subject to heightened strict scrutiny review rather than intermediate
scrutiny, because (1) the regulations are a content-based regulation of
speech, (2) tour guides engage in political speech when they interact
with tourists, and (3) burdensome licensing hurdles can constitute a
form of compelled speech for tour guides.
Part II will outline the factual and legal background of the circuit
split and relevant frameworks for First Amendment analysis. Part III
will argue that tour guide speech constitutes protected political speech
and that local licensing regulations should be subject to heightened
strict scrutiny review. Part IV summarizes the argument and the
broader context of the issue.

6

See, e.g., Kristin Tracy, “And to Your Left You’ll See . . . ”: Licensed Tour Guides, the First
Amendment, and the Free Market, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 169 (2016).
7
Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 135 S. Ct. 1403 (2015).
8
755 F.3d 996.
9
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
10
Id. at 2371–72.
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II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Circuit Split
Two federal circuit courts of appeals are currently split regarding
whether city tour guide licensing requirements restrict speech in violation of the First Amendment. On one side of the split is the Fifth Circuit
in Kagan v. City of New Orleans,11 a 2014 decision. In Kagan, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that granted summary judgment
to the city of New Orleans against plaintiff tour guides who claimed
that the city’s licensing scheme infringed upon their First Amendment
free speech rights.12 The city required its tour guides to: 1) “pass an
examination on knowledge of the city’s historical, cultural, and sociological developments,” 2) not have been convicted of a felony within the
past five years, 3) pass a drug test, and 4) pay a $50 initial licensing
fee.13 The court first noted that under a facial review of the city’s licensing law, the law furthered a clear purpose of “promot[ing] and protect[ing]” visitors and tourists by identifying “those tour guides who
have licenses and are reliable, being knowledgeable about the city and
trustworthy, law-abiding and free of drug addiction.”14 The law was
thus a permissible exercise of the city’s police power serving an important governmental purpose.15
However, the Fifth Circuit proceeded to engage in intermediate
scrutiny review in accordance with the District of Columbia district
court’s analysis in the Edwards case (regarding the District’s law).16
The court distinguished the case law cited by plaintiffs-appellants—
cases requiring strict scrutiny analysis because the relevant laws were
content based—by reasoning that the New Orleans ordinance at issue
was content-neutral.17 New Orleans’s licensing requirements, the Fifth
Circuit noted, while somewhat rigorous, had “no effect whatsoever on
the content of what tour guides say.”18 The court held that the law survived intermediate scrutiny review because it “promote[d] a substantial

11

753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 561.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 561–62.
16
Id. at 562 (citing Edwards v. Dist. of Columbia, 943 F. Supp. 2d 109, 118 (D.D.C. 2013))
(holding that a similar tour guide licensing scheme in the District of Columbia did not violate the
First Amendment under intermediate scrutiny review because “[n]othing about the District’s interest in keeping visitors from dangerous, unethical, or uninformed guides [was] remotely related
to the suppression of free expression, or intended to control the content of what . . . tour guide[s]
may say during tours”).
17
Id.
18
Id.
12
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interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”19
By requiring tour guides to sustain a foundation of knowledge about the
city and not be felons or drug addicts, the law promoted a government
interest of city and visitor safety that would be unserved without the
law’s protections. The New Orleans ordinance thus did not violate the
First Amendment, so the licensing requirements could remain in effect.20
On the other side of the split is the D.C. Circuit in Edwards v. District of Columbia,21 also decided in 2014. The case was similar to Kagan
in its premise: a group of for-hire city tour guides, who owned and operated a Segway-rental and tour business called “Segs in the City,”
brought a First Amendment challenge against the District, alleging
that its licensing scheme for tour guides constituted an unacceptable
limitation on protected speech.22 To qualify for an official license to work
as a city tour guide, an applicant was obligated to:
(1) be at least eighteen years old . . . (2) be proficient in English
. . . (3) not have been convicted of certain specified felonies . . .
(4) make a sworn statement that all statements contained in his
or her application are true and pay all required licensing fees . . .
and (5) pass an examination “covering the applicant’s knowledge
of buildings and points of historical and general interest in the
District.”23
The plaintiffs specifically objected to the District’s regulations that levied civil and criminal penalties like fines on individuals who conducted
a tour without first satisfying these requirements.24 According to the
plaintiffs, the exam requirement was particularly rigorous, as it consisted of 100 multiple-choice questions and drew from subject matter in
fourteen different categories, including Architecture, Dates, Government, Historical Events, and Regulations.25 Similar to the Fifth Circuit
in Kagan, the district court held that the law survived intermediate
scrutiny analysis and did not violate the First Amendment.26
On appeal, the plaintiff-appellants presented two principal arguments: (1) the tour guide regulations were a content-based restriction
on speech rather than a content-neutral restriction on conduct, and
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
Id.
Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1000.
Id.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 999–1000.
Id. at 1000.
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thus qualified for strict scrutiny review; and in the alternative, (2) even
if the regulations were content-neutral, they would fail intermediate
scrutiny review because there was an insufficient evidentiary basis to
conclude that the regulations promoted a substantial government interest that would otherwise be achieved less effectively.27 The Edwards
court declined to decide the question of whether strict scrutiny should
apply, as it agreed with the appellants’ second argument: the city’s regulations failed even under the more lenient intermediate scrutiny
standard.28
In its analysis, the D.C. Circuit assumed arguendo that the regulations were content-neutral and placed only incidental burdens on
speech.29 The court proceeded with analysis under the intermediate
scrutiny standard, under which a government regulation is constitutional if:
(1) “it is within the constitutional power of the Government”; (2)
“it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest”;
(3) “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression”; (4) “the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest;” and (5) the regulation leaves open ample alternative channels for communication . . . .
The court’s analysis fixated primarily on the government’s economic interest in promoting the tourism industry. Ultimately, the court held
that the District’s law failed the second and the fourth prongs.30 In respect to the second prong, the District had presented no evidence in the
record that ill-informed tour guides (the issue that purportedly justified
the multiple-choice exam) were in fact a problem for the city’s tourism
industry,31 or that the exam regulation actually furthered the District’s
interest in preventing the stated harms.32 As to the fourth prong, the
District had provided no evidence that normal market forces, such customer reviews on Yelp or tour guide companies’ own economic interests
in attracting customers through high-quality tours, would not serve as
an adequate defense to “seedy, slothful tour guides” on their own as an
alternative to the regulation.33 The District had also failed to provide
evidence that less rigorous requirements would not be equally effective
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1009.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1006–1007.
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in promoting their governmental interest.34 Thus, there was no justification for the District’s argument that the restrictive laws were the
most effective means of accomplishing its stated objectives.35
Additionally, the court found inconsistencies in the District’s position. For example, while tour buses with pre-recorded audio narrations
were exempt from the licensing requirement, the regulations still applied to guides who used audio guides or distributed pamphlets instead
of speaking while on a guided walking or Segway tour.36 The court held
that the tour bus exemption was arbitrary and thus rendered the regulations impermissibly underinclusive, as they restricted speech for
some groups but not others.37 This could potentially lead the District to
favor or disfavor a particular type of speech in its implementation of the
policy. In addition, the court held that if the regulations are understood
primarily as a restriction on conduct with only incidental effects on
speech, then they were overbroad because they would forbid an unlicensed individual from lecturing to a tour guide even if accompanied by
a fully licensed guide.38 Thus, finding that the government regulations
were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to directly advance the District’s
asserted interests, the court struck down the licensing scheme as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.39
Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the tour guides’ appeal of Kagan, the circuit split has not been resolved. Classifying and
analyzing the appropriate constitutional framework for tour guide
speech can help identify the proper legal outcome for a future reviewing
court.
To frame the terms of the debate, the primary doctrinal question is
whether the states’ regulation of tour guides’ speech is content-based or
content-neutral. Content-neutral regulations limit speech without regard to the message that is being conveyed, while content-based restrictions limit speech because of the message conveyed.40 Contentbased laws are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict
scrutiny,41 while content-neutral laws generally must survive only intermediate scrutiny.42 Determining how to classify tour guides’ speech

34

Id. at 1009.
Id.
36
Id. at 1008.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1008–09.
39
Id.
40
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 189–90 (1983).
41
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
42
Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014).
35
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thus informs the nature of the judicial scrutiny a regulation should receive and the likelihood it will be upheld.
B. The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra
Decision as it Relates to Tour Guide Speech
Although the Supreme Court has not issued a ruling on the tour
guide licensing regime question, its decision in NIFLA in 2018 adds
more color to discussion about occupational or professional speech. How
the Court thinks about this type of speech could be relevant to the tour
guide analysis. NIFLA involved a First Amendment action brought by
two crisis pregnancy centers—pro-life centers that offer pregnancy-related services—in California against state and local officials.43 The centers challenged a state law called the California Reproductive Freedom,
Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT
Act) that required clinics that primarily served pregnant women to post
certain notices at their facilities.44 These notices included (1) for licensed clinics, a statement that California provided free or low-cost services, including abortions (with a phone number to call); or (2) for unlicensed clinics, a notice that the state of California had not licensed the
clinic to provide medical services.45 The state alleged that the purpose
of the FACT Act was to “ensure that California residents make their
personal reproductive health care decisions knowing their rights and
the health care services available to them.”46 However, the petitioners
alleged that the notice requirements violated their First Amendment
rights by compelling them to engage in speech about abortion, a practice
which the crisis pregnancy centers opposed.47
The Court held that the notice requirements violated the First
Amendment and were unconstitutional, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.48 The Court commented specifically on the appropriate level of
scrutiny for the notice requirement for the licensed medical clinics. It
determined that California’s law was content-based because it “target[ed] speech based on its communicative content”—in this instance,
the availability of abortions in the state.49 Typically, content-based restrictions on speech are subject to an exacting strict scrutiny analysis
on review, under which they “are presumptively unconstitutional and
may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2365 (2018) (NIFLA).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2369.
See id. at 2370.
See id. at 2378.
Id. at 2371 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
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tailored to serve compelling state interests.”50 However, the Ninth Circuit had not applied strict scrutiny even though the law was contentbased because it found that the notice requirement regulated professional speech, which it reasoned was afforded less protection than other
forms of speech.51 Under this less demanding level of scrutiny, the
Ninth Circuit held that the California law did not violate the First
Amendment.52
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s distinction of professional
speech as a separate category of speech subject to different rules or a
different standard of scrutiny.53 The Court stated that “[s]peech is not
unprotected merely because it is uttered by professionals.”54 As the
Court reasoned, less protection for professional speech has been afforded by the Court only in two distinct circumstances: (1) where a law
requires professionals to disclose factual and noncontroversial information in their commercial speech;55 and (2) where a law regulates professional conduct that incidentally involves speech, such as in a lawyer’s
efforts to procure clients.56 In the case of the crisis pregnancy centers,
neither line of precedents was implicated.57
The Court reasoned that in the context of professional speech, content-based regulations pose the same risks as in any other circumstance
in which the state seeks to “suppress unpopular ideas or information”
rather than to advance a legitimate regulatory goal.58 Accordingly,
there was no constitutional basis for affording this type of speech disparate treatment.59 Because government policing of the content of professional speech threatens to infringe the “uninhibited marketplace of
ideas” necessary to uncover the truth (and in the areas of medicine and
public health, potentially save lives), content-based regulations must
undergo strict scrutiny review as in other contexts.60 Moreover, the category of professional speech could be difficult to define, and states could
choose the amount of protection particular speech receives simply by
requiring a license for that profession of the speaker.61

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.
NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2337.
Id. at 2370.
Id. at 2371–72.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 2372 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
Id. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).
See id.
Id. at 2366 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2374.
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Applying the strict scrutiny review it deemed appropriate, the
Court held that the notice requirement was “wildly underinclusive” because it singled out crisis pregnancy centers by requiring the disclosures, excluding from its scope numerous other types of health centers
and community clinics that educated women about health care services.62 The Court also noted that there were other ways that the state
could have conveyed or publicized the information to women aside from
requiring compelled disclosures for the clinics.63 Consequently, the
Court held that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest that California asserted. The notice requirement was
essentially a form of content-based compelled speech for the crisis pregnancy centers and could not withstand strict scrutiny review.64
C. Defining Tour Guides’ Speech: Relevant First Amendment Frameworks
In order to articulate a legal theory to resolve the circuit split concerning tour guides’ speech, it is necessary to classify the exact nature
of this speech. This analysis will help indicate the appropriate legal
framework a court should use when weighing licensing schemes within
the First Amendment’s bounds. Ultimately, I conclude that political
speech is the appropriate classification.
1.

Occupational or professional speech

An initial question is whether tour guides’ speech could be plausibly identified as occupational or professional speech. The Supreme
Court held in NIFLA that professional speech is not a separate category
subject to a distinct level of scrutiny,65 and relevant academic commentary66 suggests that tour guide speech may not fall into this category
anyway (which could inform how we conceptualize the effect of the
NIFLA decision on the circuit split).
In her article, Licensing Knowledge, Professor Claudia E. Haupt
provides some color regarding what types of speech could plausibly be
considered professional at all, as opposed to pure First Amendment
speech.67 Haupt argues for a distinction between passing along mere
information, as a tour guide does, and giving actual professional advice,

62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 2375.
Id. at 2376.
Id. at 2375.
Id.
See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 VAND. L. REV. 501 (2019).
See id.
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as a doctor does.68 She contends that professional speech (i.e., speech
that could defensibly be subject to state licensing requirements that do
not undermine First Amendment protections) goes beyond “the conveyance of raw information” and is instead
individualized to the situation of the client[,] . . . tied to a body
of disciplinary knowledge from which it gains authority, and . . .
occurs within a social relationship that is defined by knowledge
asymmetry between speaker and listener, reliance on the
speaker’s advice, and trust in the accuracy of that advice.69
In Haupt’s view, tour guide speech is mere information conveyance rather than the offering of professional advice. Thus, state licensing requirements are less justified because the state lacks the viable objective
of preventing tangible harm to consumers.70
In another article, The Limits of Professional Speech, Haupt further articulates her argument for narrowing the boundaries of what we
conceptualize as professional speech.71 She argues that the objective of
licensing professionals’ speech is to ensure that clients receive “accurate, comprehensive, and reliable advice” that comports with modern
scientific and academic knowledge of the relevant topic, and that the
notion of “professional speech” should be defined narrowly to limit the
scope of malpractice liability for some forms of “false speech.”72 Haupt
argues that the required crisis pregnancy center disclosures in NIFLA
should not have been analyzed by the Ninth Circuit under professional
speech terms because the required disclosures regulated the delivery of
medical services rather than the content of actual professional advice.73
Under Haupt’s theory, an employee conveying information to his or
her customers (like a tour guide does) would present a more viable First
Amendment defense to a licensing requirement than would a professional conveying specialized disciplinary knowledge (like a doctor).74
This “information vs. knowledge” distinction, assuming that tour guides

68

Id. at 529–30.
Id. at 529.
70
Id. at 530.
71
Claudia E. Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 185 (2018).
72
Id. at 185; see also King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 319 (D.N.J. 2013)
(“[T]here is a more fundamental problem with [the argument that professional counseling is
speech], because taken to its logical end, it would mean that any regulation of professional counseling necessarily implicates fundamental First Amendment free speech rights, and therefore
would need to withstand heightened scrutiny to be permissible. Such a result runs counter to the
longstanding principle that a state generally may enact laws rationally regulating professionals,
including those providing medicine and mental health services.”).
73
See Haupt, supra note 71, at 193–95.
74
See Haupt, supra note 66, at 532–33.
69
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do not provide “knowledge” in the same way doctors do, provides support to the D.C. Circuit’s view in Edwards that city tour guides submit
a colorable First Amendment claim against licensing schemes.
2.

Commercial speech

Another relevant classification of speech for tour guides is commercial speech. This is because city tour guides are often employed by a
private tour guide company rather than operating freelance or being
employed by the city itself.75 Commercial speech, for purposes of First
Amendment analysis, is defined as expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.76 Essentially, it does no
more than propose a commercial transaction.77 For example, advertisements for the prices of prescription drugs constitute commercial
speech.78 Commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, but
the Constitution accords it a lesser protection than it does other constitutionally safeguarded expression.79 Under the four-part test articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, the government may regulate commercial speech if:
(1) the speech at issue concerns lawful activity and is not misleading;
(2) the asserted government interest is substantial; (3) the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.80
In all likelihood, tour guides’ speech cannot be classified as commercial speech. Beyond simply proposing an economic transaction to
visitors, tour guides provide commentary on the geography, history, politics, and sociology of a given city, which serves to enrich tourists’ intangible enjoyment of the destination rather than target their economic
interests. It is thus unlikely that governments could use this framework
to justify licensing requirements.
3.

Political speech

There is a far more colorable argument for classifying tour guides’
speech as political speech, which is afforded the strongest First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court has identified political speech as
75

Tour Guide Career, IRESEARCH, http://career.iresearchnet.com/career-information/tour-gu
ide-career/ [https://perma.cc/48KD-5ZSH].
76
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (citing
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
77
Id.
78
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
79
See, e.g., Gibson v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins.—Div. of Workers’ Comp., 700 F.3d 227, 233–34 (5th
Cir. 2012).
80
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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core First Amendment speech, critical to the functioning of the U.S.
democratic system.81 As the Court has affirmed, “the practice of persons
sharing common views banding together to achieve a common end”—
such as marches and protest activities—is “deeply embedded in the
American political process” and invokes particularly forceful First
Amendment protections.82 Furthermore, the location of the activities
matters, as restrictions on speech in a traditional public forum like
streets and sidewalks are reviewed under the strictest level of scrutiny.83
If tour guide speech constitutes a form of political speech, licensing
restrictions are more likely to be analyzed under a rigorous strict scrutiny standard. In addition to protecting protest activities, courts have
interpreted the First Amendment’s core political speech protections to
prevent the government from making it difficult for people to talk to
each other about political issues.84 Political speech includes “interactive
communication concerning political change,”85 “advocacy of political reform,”86 “handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint,”87 and “persuasive speech seeking support for particular
causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues.”88
Given that tour guides enter their posts with differing perceptions of a
city’s history, cultural customs, and anthropological development colored by their personal experiences and ideological views, there is a plausible argument that tour guide speech constitutes protected political
speech.
4.

Compelled speech

An alternative or additional possibility is that tour guide licensing
requirements are tantamount to compelled speech, impermissible under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that just as the
First Amendment can prevent the government from prohibiting speech,
it can prevent the government from compelling individuals to express

81

See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 369 (1931)) (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful
means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system.”).
82
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907 (1982) (internal citation omitted).
83
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990).
84
See, e.g., Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1313 (D. Utah
2001) (citing Campbell v. Buckley, 203 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2000)).
85
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22 (1988).
86
Id. at 421 n.4.
87
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
88
See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
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certain views, or to pay subsidies for speech to which they object.89 In
United States v. United Foods, Inc.,90 the Court held that assessments
imposed on fresh mushroom handlers pursuant to a statute to fund advertisements promoting mushroom sales violated the First Amendment.91 In NIFLA, the Court struck down the crisis pregnancy center
notice requirements because it found that they compelled individuals to
speak a particular message, thus altering the content of their speech.92
Requiring aspiring tour guides to prepare for and pass a content-based
examination about the city’s culture, history, and sociology (which was
being required in both Kagan93 and Edwards94) or to pay a fee in order
to qualify for a state license (as was the case in Kagan95) could constitute compelled speech because these requirements force tour guides to
express or subsidize a set of factual positions selected by the state.
Returning to The Limits of Professional Speech, Haupt argues that
the disclosures required in NIFLA should be properly analyzed under
the compelled speech doctrine articulated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,96 rather than classified as a form of true professional
speech.97 In Zauderer, the Court subjected certain required consumer
disclosures only to rational basis review, because the advertisers’
speech interests were outweighed by the state’s interest in preventing
consumer deception or confusion.98 In the tour guide context, the relevant question is whether and to what extent cities’ interest in preventing tourists’ confusion or deception outweighs tour guides’ interest in
communicating their (potentially political) views during their tours.99 If
the cities’ interest prevails substantially, then the infringement upon
the guides’ free speech protections should be subject to a lower standard
of review, like rational basis review.100 In Zauderer, the court identified
the protection of consumers’ interest in information as they navigate
the marketplace as the principal objective of the compelled
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disclosures.101 The cities’ interest in providing visitors with accurate information about the locale’s history and culture could justify compelling
potential guides to gain familiarity with certain information.
D. The Appropriate Level of First Amendment Scrutiny for Tour
Guide Speech.
The key doctrinal question to inform future courts’ consideration of
tour guide regulations is what level of scrutiny should be appropriately
afforded. The court in Edwards declined to rule on the question of
whether they must undergo strict scrutiny review because it determined that the District of Columbia regulations did not survive even
intermediate scrutiny.102 Intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral restrictions that place an incidental burden on speech.103 While
courts have formulated intermediate scrutiny differently, the regulation on speech is generally required to serve an “important” or “substantial” interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression.104 Strict
scrutiny, on the other hand, applies to government restrictions on the
content of protected speech,105 particularly political speech,106 or the
speech of disfavored speakers.107 Strict scrutiny requires that the challenged statute be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest.108
The level of scrutiny afforded to tour guide licensing requirements
critically informs whether they will survive under the First Amendment. The key inquiry is whether the burdens imposed on would-be tour
guides (like multiple choice exams) restrict the content of would-be tour
guides’ speech, or whether these burdens are content-neutral in nature.
This further highlights the question of to what extent tour guide commentary is tantamount to political speech.
III. ARGUMENTS
A. Tour Guide Speech is an Important First Amendment Issue.
As an initial matter, it is important to establish that tour guide
speech is a category that substantially requires First Amendment
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protections. Recent demographic and economic trends in the profession
and the tourism industry generally illustrate the need for an ideologically diverse cohort of tour guides in the United States. First, domestic
tourism to and within the U.S. is growing, so more people are visiting
U.S. cities and listening to tour guides’ speech.109 For foreign visitors,
the ideologies and views represented in a live tour have the potential to
color perspectives of the U.S. more generally. For domestic tourists, exposure to a particular tour guide’s viewpoint could either mitigate or
reinforce the country’s polarized political divide.
Second, academic research indicates that with the rapid expansion
of information technology, visitors who do opt for human tour guides
increasingly rely on them to provide interactive and personalized experiences rather than simply communicate facts.110 Tourists seeking raw
information about the locale are more likely to rely on the Internet or
other digital sources, so a human tour guide plays a growing role as a
communicator and experience-broker, rather than a one-way presenter
and entertainer.111 In their article “The Changing Face of the Tour
Guide,” Professors Betty Weiler and Rosemary Black argue that tour
guides broker visitors’ experiences by facilitating encounters with certain physical access points and by channeling their communication expertise to empathize with each unique visitor.112 Because tour guides
assume growing communicative responsibility to add legitimate value
to visitors’ experiences over the Internet, there is greater room for interjection of guides’ personal experiences with a particular location or
cultural tradition—a practice which necessarily implicates speech.
Third, the current cohort of tour guides in the U.S. lacks substantial demographic diversity, which illustrates the importance of facilitating minority perspectives in the profession.113 In 2019, sixty-nine percent of tour guides in the U.S. were White.114 The next highest groups
were “Other” (seven percent) and Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish (seven
percent).115 Additionally, the majority of tour guides in the U.S. have
some level of post-high school education: thirty-six percent hold a certificate or associate degree, twenty percent hold a bachelor’s degree, and
nine percent hold a master’s degree.116 As a result, perspectives and
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experiences from lower socioeconomic classes may be excluded from the
profession and shielded from tourists.
Since tour guides do not necessarily represent a diverse range of
perspectives to tourists under current industry demographics—and
there is a growing responsibility for guides to provide personalized communicative expertise as information technology expands—it is important for guides to receive vigorous First Amendment protections and
face fewer state-imposed barriers to entry into the profession.
B. Tour Guide Speech Does Not Constitute a Form of Professional
Speech Over Which the Government’s Police Powers Should Justify Licensing Requirements.
Though the Supreme Court held in NIFLA that professional speech
should not be analyzed under a different legal standard with respect to
its First Amendment protections, a compelling question still arises regarding the bounds of what we conceive as professional speech and
whether tour guide speech fits into this framework. In her scholarship,
Cynthia Haupt advanced the claim that there is a distinction between
passing along mere information as a tour guide and giving actual professional advice as a doctor.117 She argues that the notion of professional
speech should be defined narrowly to encapsulate only the conveyance
of knowledge to avoid impermissibly expanding the scope of the doctrine.118
Consistent with Haupt’s theory, tour guide speech should not be
categorized as professional speech that could defensibly be subject to
state regulations such as licensing requirements. However, in divergence from Haupt’s theory, tour guide speech does not constitute “mere
information conveyance,” more similar to that of a sales cashier than
that of a doctor. Given tour guides’ critical role in channeling their personal communication skills and unique backgrounds to personalize
tourists’ experiences,119 tour guides’ speech should be classified as political speech rather than falling neatly at either end of Haupt’s proposed spectrum.120
While the government should be permitted by its police powers to
regulate the activities of pure knowledge-based professionals like doctors, whose giving of misinformation could risk serious harm to patients
or clients, it should not be permitted to regulate the information tour
guides give that often bleeds into guides’ personal opinions. Thus, to the
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extent courts conceptualize professional speech as speech that the government can regulate, tour guide speech should not be grouped into this
category at all. While tour guides are often employed by larger corporations or organizations, unlike doctors they communicate information to
clients in a way that is necessarily informed by their own personalized
experiences and not beholden to scientific research or the findings of
the relevant knowledge community. While there is some degree of information asymmetry between tour guides and visitors regarding the
history, norms, and culture of the relevant locale, the harms of misinformation to consumers are more likely psychic rather than entailing a
risk of physical or medical harm, which should limit the scope of the
government’s viable interest in regulation. Moreover, even if tour
guides’ speech could plausibly be grouped with that of doctors or lawyers (under a similar theory of information asymmetry, perhaps),
NIFLA would require heightened scrutiny of the speech assuming that
it is content-based as this Comment argues that it is.121 Finally, because
tour guide speech is political, and thus enjoys particularly forceful First
Amendment protections,122 state restrictions in the form of strict licensing regimes must fail strict scrutiny review.
A potential counterargument is that tour guides are typically employed by companies, rather than operating freelance, and are thus operating in a professional capacity rather than in a personal capacity.
Additionally, there is some risk of harm to their clients (tourists) if they
communicate misinformation. However, tour guides cannot feasibly be
subjected to malpractice liability like doctors can, and the risk of physical harm to clients is undoubtedly lower than in contexts like medicine.
Tour guides should receive an even stronger First Amendment shield
than doctors for communicating information that is not consistent with
the accepted standard of knowledge, for example, if they happen to have
an unconventional view. This is especially the case because doctors are
less likely to convey political opinions or address ideological topics as
they communicate knowledge to patients. And for tour guides, even
without the threat of potential malpractice liability, the risk of receiving poor customer reviews and being subjected to natural market forces
should sufficiently deter them from providing misinformation.
Another obvious weakness with Haupt’s position is the difficulty in
line-drawing between knowledge-based and information-based speech,
which the ambiguity of classifying tour guides’ speech aptly illustrates.
While tour guide speech bears more closely to the conveyance of
knowledge-based advice than Haupt concedes, it is ultimately an
121
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oversimplification to reduce some forms of occupational speech as
wholly devoid of interjections of the speaker’s opinions. While governments can likely make stronger arguments in favor of regulating
knowledge-based speech within the legal exercise of police powers, the
distinction is largely inapposite in light of NIFLA’s rejection of professional speech as a legally distinguishable category.123
C. Tour Guide Speech Constitutes Protected Political Speech.
Rather than being analyzed under the umbrella of professional or
commercial speech, tour guides’ speech should be classified as a form of
political speech that must receive particularly forceful and heightened
First Amendment protections.124 Tour guides do not operate in a professional vacuum nor simply communicate information that is wholly detached from their personalized life experiences. Assuming that tour
guides have lived in, spent time in, or acquired information about the
relevant city by some means over the course of their lifetimes, tour
guides’ perceptions of a city’s sociological development, political history,
and esoteric customs are necessarily colored by their distinct personal
and political ideologies. Moreover, tour guides’ communication style
and word choice reflects their personalities and psychological makeup,
which academic literature indicates can be correlated with political
preferences.125 One study indicated that the frequency of particular
words that people used on Twitter correlated with Democratic or Republican political affiliation.126 For example, Democrats were more
likely to use emotionally expressive words and focus on entertainment
and culture rather than politics, while Republicans used swear words
less frequently and highlighted their religiosity more often.127 Democrats were also more likely to use first-person singular pronouns (perhaps reflecting their desire to emphasize uniqueness), while Republicans were more likely to use first-person plural and third-person
masculine pronouns.128 Since even tour guides who follow a script likely
do not plan out every word ahead of time (especially when responding
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to visitors’ questions), there is ample room for guides’ personality traits
and ideological preferences—to the extent that they are correlated with
certain word choices or modes of diction—to bleed through and reach
listeners. And this is especially the case with the increasing industry
demand for guides to empathize and connect with visitors to provide
interactive in-person experiences.129
Political speech includes “interactive communication concerning
political change,”130 and the First Amendment protects the ability of
people to talk freely to each other about political issues.131 Since tour
guides—either explicitly or implicitly—communicate their understanding of certain political events or figures through their choice of rhetoric
(and the words that they select could be correlated with ideological preference), there is a colorable argument that their speech could be classified as political. Accordingly, courts reviewing cities’ licensing requirements should interpret the content of tours as a form of “interactive
communication” relating to political issues,132 rather than simply a oneway transmission of information within an employee’s workday as
Haupt classified it. Acknowledging the expressive nature of tour guides’
interactive communication with visitors—and the ideological views that
are consciously or subconsciously transmitted—would require particularly forceful First Amendment protections and strict scrutiny review
of regulations.133 For example, tour guides could make comments about
political figures in the city or describe a landmark in a particular way
that reflects their ideologies. This designation as political speech would
provide tour guides with the utmost First Amendment immunity from
burdensome licensing schemes that could potentially have the effect of
suppressing their speech. In resolving the circuit split, this would provide further support to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Edwards striking
down the licensing requirements.
A possible counterargument is that tour guides may largely stick
to a script in communicating the content of their tours to clients, so
there may not be much room for interjection of political preferences or
ideology. However, as discussed above, tour guides’ choice of rhetoric or
diction regarding a particular historical or political event can subconsciously convey an implicit bias or internalized ideological viewpoint.
And as indicated by academic literature, personality traits alone could
reflect political attitudes, especially if visitors on the tours are
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particularly perceptive.134 For example, political conservatives are more
likely to display resistance to change and acceptance of inequality,
while political liberals are more likely to display openness and agreeableness.135 These are certainly traits that visitors could perceive as they
interact with their guides and ask questions, even if the guides generally stick to a script. Additionally, tour guides could choose to explicitly
communicate their beliefs on a particular subject matter. More data regarding the script requirements for guides compared by U.S. cities
could lend further credence to this argument. But given the level of personal engagement between tour guides and visitors and the likely opportunity for visitors to ask personalized questions, there is a strong
case for the political speech designation even if the majority of a given
tour follows a regular formula.
D. Regulation of Tour Guide Speech is Content-Based Rather than
Content-Neutral, so the Proper Legal Standard for Evaluating
Tour Guide Licensing Requirements is Strict Scrutiny.
Rather than the intermediate scrutiny review under which the D.C.
Circuit struck down the District of Columbia’s statute in Edwards, tour
guide licensing requirements should be analyzed under a heightened
strict scrutiny review. Strict scrutiny applies to government restrictions
on the content of protected speech.136 Even if cities’ licensing schemes
do not explicitly impose requirements on the information included in
the tours, and the tour guides theoretically remain free to say what they
wish, they can still impact the content of the tours that are ultimately
permitted to proceed. This is because the requirements function as a
mechanism allowing the state to select what types of people they will
permit to become tour guides to begin with, which directly affects the
content of the tours that reach visitors. Rigorous multiple-choice tests
and high licensing fees could impose high costs of entry for would-be
tour guides and could potentially incentivize some people interested in
the profession to opt out. For example, potential guides of lower socioeconomic classes may be unable to afford the licensing fees, or individuals with lower education levels may not be sufficiently equipped to
prepare for the written exams.
Possibly, individuals who would opt out because of the requirements could be individuals with politically dissenting views who may
not educate or finance themselves within the conventional societal
framework (which could be correlated with overcoming the licensing
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thresholds and succeeding in entering the profession). This seems especially plausible because most tour guides in the U.S. are currently white
individuals with some level of post-high school education.137 At the very
least, there is certainly a colorable argument that the requirements select for people who are more educated, more affluent, and less likely to
have committed a crime. Especially in light of my discussion above regarding implicit and explicit ideological rhetoric and biases, the licensing requirements could have the effect of favoring one form of political
speech (i.e., one set of views) over others. For this reason, the licensing
requirements are not content-neutral and should receive heightened
strict scrutiny review.
The obvious counterargument is that the licensing statutes simply
impose a set of requirements for tour guides and have no effect whatsoever on the content of what they actually say. However, given the current lack of educational (and thus socioeconomic) diversity in the profession,138 it is highly plausible that the cumbersome nature of fees and
exam requirements tend to favor some societal groups (i.e., more educated and affluent individuals) and impose higher upfront costs on others. And this may affect the content of the tours that the city ultimately
allows to go forward.
E. Licensing Requirements for Tour Guides Constitute a Form of
Compelled Speech.
There is a plausible argument that certain elements of the cities’
licensing requirements, like written examinations and mandatory fees,
constitute a form of compelled speech. Most likely, however, this classification would be largely fact dependent. Through its analysis of compelled disclosures, NIFLA again becomes relevant in this discussion.
The licensing requirements are most likely to constitute compelled
speech where they require potential tour guides to pass a written examination, thereby compelling them to learn a particular framework of
understanding about the city’s history, culture, and sociological realities. In both Kagan and Edwards, the relevant cities (New Orleans and
the District of Columbia, respectively) required tour guides to pass written examinations. In Edwards, the examination addressed content from
fourteen different categories, which included “Government,” “Historical
Events,” and “Regulations.”139 As discussed above, a particular resident’s perception of a particular historical event (e.g., the Civil War) or
a state regulation could vary drastically from another’s based on his or
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her identity, demographics, and personal experiences. By requiring tour
guides to learn a state-selected set of facts (which could potentially
bleed into ideologies) and implicitly representing them as the foundation for state-sanctioned tours, local government thus compel tour
guides to endorse a certain set of views.
The same could be said for mandatory licensing fees (which were
required in the facts of Kagan), which would analogously require tour
guides to subsidize the continued state endorsement of this set of ideologies.140 Similar to the Court’s reasoning in NIFLA, which rejected a
separate First Amendment framework of analysis for professional
speech,141 the exam requirements and fees may constitute compelled
speech and should not receive lessened First Amendment scrutiny
simply because they occur in a professional context. Rather, they should
be reviewed under strict scrutiny because they constitute a contentbased regulation of speech.142
Under the Zauderer framework that Haupt would require, cities’
interest in avoiding confusion or deception of tourists likely does not
outweigh tour guides’ interest in communicating their personal views
to visitors, which the written examinations in particular could have the
potential to hinder. This is because the content of tours amounts to a
form of political speech—which receives particularly forceful First
Amendment protections—and risking tourist confusion is unlikely to
cause constitutional harm. So the regulations should not receive a less
rigorous standard of judicial scrutiny because the state’s interest is obviously countervailing.143 As a caveat to this point, evidence that tourist
misinformation is rampant in a particular city as a result of unreliable
guides—which does not currently appear to exist anecdotally or on a
quantitative scale—could tip the scales in favor of the state’s interest.
Additionally, the applicability of the compelled speech doctrine here is
again largely fact dependent. While the cities in both Kagan and Edwards required written examinations for tour guides, another city could
theoretically impose other licensing requirements that do or do not violate the First Amendment without implicating the compelled speech
doctrine at all.
A potentially compelling counterargument here is that the required
written examinations and fees do not appear to alter the content of the
tours themselves, after the guides ultimately receive their licenses
(short of evidence that a city actually requires its guides to communicate the material reflected on the exams). While this argument
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certainly limits the strength of the compelled speech argument, it is
plausible that the nature of the material chosen for the exams colors
the tour guides’ understanding of the city’s history, politics, and sociology, especially given the effects of recency bias that could compel tour
guides to prioritize this new knowledge over previously existing ideological views or perceptions of the city. The presence of certain material
on the examination could also imply to tour guides that they are discouraged from or expected not to expressly contradict this information
in their tours (and guides have an incentive to follow actual or perceived
state policies in order to avoid losing their jobs). Furthermore, while
less apposite to the question of the circuit split itself (which concerns
licensing requirements), tour guide companies’ internal rules and employee expectations have the potential to inhibit a tour guide’s speech
or compel expression of a particular set of views.
F.

The Circuit Split is Properly Resolved by Adopting the D.C. Circuit’s Interpretation in Edwards.

In resolving the existing circuit split, the proper legal outcome is
similar to the approach that the D.C. Circuit adopted in Edwards: rigorous licensing requirements imposed on potential tour guides constitute an unacceptable limitation on protected speech in violation of the
First Amendment.144 Moreover, although the Edwards court declined to
decide the question, these licensing statutes should be subjected to
heightened strict scrutiny review rather than intermediate scrutiny, because intensive licensing schemes can have the effect of altering the
content of tour guide speech that is permitted to reach the tourist audience. The interest in safeguarding tour guides’ First Amendment rights
should outweigh the cities’ police powers-based efforts to regulate the
local tourism industry because tour guides engage in a form of vigorously protected political speech. This is an especially critical concern
given the increasing reliance on human tour guides to provide communicative and personalized experiences to visitors.145

144
145

Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
See Weiler & Black, supra note 4, at 364.

450

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
IV. CONCLUSION

Protecting tour guide speech matters. Tour guides can serve as the
primary liaisons and gatekeepers to U.S. cities, and the ways in which
they represent the locale can meaningfully shape the perceptions of visitors and their contacts at home, both domestically and abroad. Maintaining a diverse cohort of U.S. tour guides is important to ensure that
a representative range of viewpoints on a city’s culture, politics, and
traditions are conveyed to tourists. Otherwise, the narrative of political
discourse surrounding a city as portrayed to visitors could be controlled
by the state. Because tour guide speech can convey the guides’ ideological leanings through express statements, conscious or subconscious
word choice, or even through their personalities, it should be properly
classified as political speech. And because licensing requirements constitute a filtering mechanism that can select for particular education
levels, socioeconomic classes, or even races, the speech regulations are
content-based and should receive heightened strict scrutiny review. Additionally, while largely fact dependent in its applicability, the compelled speech doctrine may limit states’ ability to require written examinations about the city or mandatory licensing fees.
There may still be room for cities and localities to retain some degree of regulatory authority over local guides without implicating the
First Amendment. A possibility could be requiring all official tour guide
companies to register with the city, so that the city has some ability to
track which groups are representing ideas about the locale to the outside world. In order to maximize free speech protections, however, it
may be wiser for cities to surrender regulatory power to the markets
and allow private mechanisms like Yelp reviews or competitive pricing
schemes to govern the success of particular types of tours or tour guides
in the city. With constitutionally shielded political discourse at stake,
perhaps states should loosen their regulatory grip on their local branding and permit the “Segs and the City”-s of the world to roam free.

